Abstract. In this paper we present a key exchange protocol based on multivariate noncommutative polynomial rings, analogous to the classic Diffie-Hellman method. Our technique extends the proposed scheme of Boucher et al. from 2010. Their method was broken by Dubois and Kammerer in 2011, who exploited the Euclidean domain structure of the chosen ring. However, our proposal is immune against such attacks, without losing the advantages of noncommutative polynomial rings as outlined by Boucher et al. Moreover, our extension is not restricted to any particular ring, but is designed to allow users to readily choose from a large class of rings when applying the protocol.
Introduction
In 2010, Boucher et al. [BGG + 10] proposed a novel Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange algorithm [DH76] based on skew polynomial rings. An outline of their protocol can be given as follows (with adapted notation): Two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, publicly agree on an element L in a predetermined skew-polynomial ring and a subset S of commuting elements. Alice then chooses two private keys P A , Q A from S and sends Bob the product P A · L · Q A . Bob similarly chooses P B , Q B from S and sends Alice P B · L · Q B . Alice computes P A · P B · L · Q B · Q A , while Bob computes P B · P A · L · Q A · Q B . Since P A · P B = P B · P A , and Q A · Q B = Q B · Q A , Alice and Bob have computed the same final element, which can be used as a secret key, either directly or by hashing. Boucher et al. claimed that it would be intractable for an eavesdropper, Eve, to compute this secret key with knowledge only of L, S, P A · L · Q A and P B · L · Q B . They based their claim on the difficulty of the factorization problem in skew-polynomial rings, in particular the non-uniqueness of factorizations.
However, in 2011, Dubois and Kammerer exploited the fact that the concrete skew-polynomial ring chosen by Boucher et al. is a Euclidean domain to successfully attack the protocol [DK11] . Following their approach, an eavesdropper Eve chooses a random element e ∈ S, and computes the greatest common right divisor of P A · L · Q A · e = P A · L · e · Q A with P A · L · Q A , which is with high probability equal to Q A . From this point on, Eve can easily recover the agreed upon key between Alice and Bob. Moreover, the authors also criticized the suggested brute-force method for Alice and Bob to generate commuting polynomials, as most of the commuting polynomials turn out to be central and thus the possible choices for private keys becomes fairly small. (An element of a ring is central if it commutes with all other elements of the ring.) After Dubois's and Kammerer's paper, interest in the application of non-commutative polynomial rings appears to have dwindled, since to the best of our knowledge no further publications considering non-commutative polynomial rings in cryptographic contexts have appeared.
It is our position that such rings can still be used to create a secure Diffie-Hellman-like protocol. The basic weakness in the scheme presented in [BGG + 10] is the choice of a univariate Ore extension as the underlying ring of the protocol, as these rings are Euclidean domains. However, the construction of Ore extensions can be iterated, and the resulting multivariate Ore polynomial rings will no longer be Euclidean. This would preclude any attack of the type proposed by Dubois and Kammerer.
The contributions of this paper are the following.
-We present a method of constructing non-commutative algebras to use in the protocol as presented in [BGG + 10]. The creation of algebras in this fashion ensures that the Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange will not be subject to attacks as described in [DK11] . At the same time the desirable properties such as non-uniqueness of the factorization remain present, as well as key-generation in a feasible amount of time.
-For our choice of non-commutative algebras, no polynomial time factorization algorithm for their elements is known. For most of them, there is not even a general factorization technique, i.e. one that is applicable to any element, discovered yet and, as some of them do not even have the property of being Noetherian, factorization algorithms may not even exist. -This paper addresses the critique given in [DK11] concerning the feasible construction of a set S of commuting, non-central elements, from which the two communicating parties choose their private keys. We show an efficient way to construct commuting polynomials, which is independent from the choice of the algebra. -We have implemented and evaluated our version of the protocol.
-Attacks based on the key-choice of A and B are studied for a concrete algebra and an overview of weak keys and their detection is presented.
Basic Notations and Definitions
Throughout the whole paper, R denotes an arbitrary domain with identity. For practical reasons we furthermore assume for any introduced ring that it is computable, i.e. one can find a finite representation of its elements, and that all arithmetics can be done in polynomial time. Also a random choice of an element in the ring R is expected to be possible with polynomial costs. Let us address the basic construction principles of so-called Ore extensions [Ore33] of R. We follow the notions from [BGTV03] , which we also recommend as a resource for a thorough introduction into the field of non-commutative algebra.
Definition 1 ( [BGTV03] , Definition 3.1). Let σ be a ring endomorphism of R. A σ-derivation of R is an additive endomorphism δ : R → R with the property that δ(rs) = σ(r)δ(s) + δ(r)s for all r, s ∈ R. We call the pair (σ, δ) a quasi-derivation.
Proposition 1 ( [BGTV03] , Proposition 3.3.). Let (σ, δ) be a quasi-derivation on R. Then there exists a ring S with the following properties:
2. there exists an element ∂ ∈ S such that S is freely generated as a left R-module by the positive powers 1, ∂, ∂ 2 , . . . of ∂; 3. for every r ∈ R, we have ∂r = σ(r)∂ + δ(r).
Definition 2 (cf. [BGTV03] , Definition 3.4). The ring S defined by the previous result and denoted by R[∂ ; σ, δ] is usually referred to as an Ore extension of R.
General Assumption: As we want the Ore extension for our protocol to have at least the property of being a domain, we assume from now on that σ is always injective (compare [BGTV03] , Proposition 3.10). In order to keep the costs of arithmetics in R[∂ ; σ, δ] polynomial, we make two additional assumptions:
(i) There exist polynomial-time algorithms to compute σ(r) and δ(r) for any given r ∈ R.
(ii) Either σ is the identity map, or δ is the zero map.
While item (i) seems to be a natural assumption, item (ii) may seem highly restrictive. But these cases cover several algebras that are studied in practice, as we will point out in the examples below. The need for this condition comes from the result of the following lemma, which can be easily proven by induction on n ∈ N.
Lemma 1. Let R[∂ ; σ, δ] be an Ore extension of R, and let r be an arbitrary element in R. Then we have the following identity for n ∈ N:
where S n denotes the permutation group on n elements and • the canonical action of the group on a list with n elements.
Without item (ii), when multiplying elements in S, we would have to compute up to 2 n images of an element r ∈ R resulting from all different ways of applying n times functions chosen from the set {σ, δ}. This is avoided by choosing one of the maps to be trivial, i.e. by our assumption (ii).
Example 1. For the Ore extensions considered in the paper [BGG + 10], the authors assumed R to be a finite field, σ to be an automorphism on R and δ to be the zero map.
Example 2. The construction of a commutative polynomial ring over a given ring R can be viewed as an Ore extension by choosing σ to be the identity map and δ to be the zero map.
Remark 1. If we choose σ not to be an automorphism, then our constructed ring is not necessarily Noetherian, which makes the general factorization problem even harder to solve. An example of a non-Noetherian Ore extension is the following: Let K be a field. Set R := K[y], the univariate polynomial ring over K. Define σ : R → R, f (y) → f (y 2 ) and set δ to be the zero map. Then (σ, δ) is a quasi-derivation, and the ring R[∂ ; σ, δ] is not Noetherian. A proof of this, and a more thorough discussion, can be found in [MR01] , section 1.3.2.
The process of building an Ore extension can be iterated. The rings that we propose to use for the key exchange protocol presented in this paper are of the form
where N ∋ n > 1, R is a commutative domain, and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either σ i is the identity map, or δ i is the zero map, according to our general assumptions. Furthermore, the σ i are injective, and there exists a subring {0} =R R, such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and r ∈R : σ i (r) = r and δ i (r) = 0. We refer toR as the subring of constants. The condition n > 1 gives us the property that our ring is neither a left nor a right principle ideal domain and therefore there exist no notion of a left-or right greatest common divisor. Thus, our construction of a Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol will not be vulnerable to the methods introduced in [DK11] .
The condition thatR, whose elements are not subject to any non-commutative relation, exists, is needed later to construct commutative subrings in rings of type (1).
There will be two kinds of rings of type (1) that will serve as model examples throughout the paper:
Definition 3. The so-called n'th Weyl algebra A n is an Ore extension of type (1). For this, let K be an arbitrary field, and K :=K(x 1 , . . . , x n ). Define for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the σ i to be identity maps, and define δ i to be the partial derivation with respect to x i . Thus,
FinallyK is the subring of constants of S. 
The factorization properties of a ring S that has the form (1) are different from commutative multivariate polynomial rings. In particular, S is not a unique factorization domain in the classical sense, i.e. factors are not just unique up to permutation and multiplication by units. Factors in S are unique up to the following notion of similarity.
Definition 4 (cf. [BGTV03] , Definition 4.9). Let R be a domain. Two elements r, s ∈ R are said to be similar, if R/Rr and R/Rs are isomorphic as left R-modules.
Example 4. Let us state a simple example in A 2 , that can be found in [Lan02] :
Besides the given factorization in the definition of h, we have the following decomposition into irreducible elements:
. The corresponding decision problem, of deciding whether two given polynomials are similar, is not possible in polynomial time to the best of our knowledge, although attempts have been made [CVHL10] .
The security of our protocol is based on the hardness of factoring non-commutative polynomial rings and the non-uniqueness of the factorization. As the next example illustrates, one might end up with infinitely many factorizations.
Example 5. Let K in Definition 3 be of characteristic zero and consider ∂ 2 1 ∈ A n . Besides factoring into ∂ 1 · ∂ 1 , it also factors for all c ∈ K into
Potential as a Post-Quantum Cryptosystem
Here we will try to give some plausible grounds for our conjecture, that the factorization problem for our rings cannot be solved in polynomial time, even with quantum algorithms. This stems from the observation that factors of an Ore polynomial p can be very large compared with p itself. Indeed, in terms of bit length representations, the size of the factors can be exponential in the size of p. For example, consider the Chebyshev differential operator
as an element in A 1 , where n is a real constant. When n is a positive integer, one can show that L has two possible factorizations. Furthermore, when n is prime one can show that these factors will contain Ω(n) non-zero terms. So their bit size grows at least as fast as n, while the size of L itself grows only as log n. Thus, the sizes of the factors are exponentially larger than the size of L. If the reader wishes to try some experimentation in Maple, we provide a code snippet in appendix B.1. Now, for the decision problem, "Is L factorable?", the obvious certificate for verification of a "yes" answer would be an actual pair of factors of L. But as we can see from this example, the size of such a certificate may not be polynomial in the input size of L. Furthermore, this problem is already occurring for the simplest possible case: a second-order operator in a univariate Ore ring. Our protocol works with much higher-order operators over many variables, so the relative size of such a certificate of factors will not improve, and may even become worse.
Of course, this does not prove that a polynomial-sized certificate could not exist. But we do not know of any, and hence we suspect that this problem may not even belong to the class N P . As there is some thought that NP-complete problems would not have polynomial-time quantum algorithms (see e.g. [Bro01] , page 297), we are therefore led to conjecture that our factorization problem would not have any such algorithm, either.
Note, though, that the above example was over a field of characteristic zero. We actually prefer to work over finite fields, to reduce expression swell in the computations. For Noetherian rings over finite fields, the hardness of factorization is less clear, though there are still no known polynomial-time algorithms for the multivariate case. But even if one exists for Noetherian rings over finite fields, one could instead choose a ring having a non-Noetherian extension. As mentioned above, we are skeptical that there is any polynomial-time algorithm for this case, using a classical computer. Unless there is some property of the non-Noetherian ring that a quantum algorithm can take advantage of, we conjecture the same is true for quantum computers.
Related Work
There exists a polynomial time algorithm that factors skew-polynomials as presented in [BGG + 10], namely [Gie98] . More generally, the algorithm is designed for an Ore extension of a finite field. Boucher et al. argued that even if an attacker can find a factorization using this algorithm, then it might not be the right one to discover the key A and B agreed upon. This can be true for certain choices of polynomials, but there is more theory needed to prove that there is a certain lower bound on the number of different factorizations.
For certain single Ore extensions of a univariate commutative polynomial ring or function field there are several algorithms and even implementations available. This is due to the fact that those extensions are algebraic generalizations of operator algebras. The most prominent publications that deal with factoring in the first Weyl algebra are [vH97b, vH96, vH97a, vHY10, GS04] ; the algorithms of the first four papers are implemented in the computer algebra system Maple [MGH + 08], and that of the fifth paper in ALLTYPES [Sch09] . For factoring elements in the first Weyl algebra with polynomial coefficients, there is an implementation [HL13] in the computer algebra system Singular [DGPS12] . The implementation also extends to the shift algebra and classes of polynomials in the so-called first q-Weyl algebra. Theoretical results for those operator algebras are shown in [Tsa94] and [Tsa96] , which extend the papers [Loe03] and [Loe06] .
The factorization problem for general multivariate Ore algebras has not, as of yet, been as well investigated.
A thorough theoretic overview of the factorization problem in Ore domains is presented in [BGTV03] .
Recently, the techniques from [HL13] were extended to factor elements in the nth Weyl algebra, the nth shift algebra and classes of polynomials in the nth q-Weyl algebra [GHL14] . However, the algorithm uses Gröbner-bases, and therefore does not run in polynomial time.
From an algebraic point of view, and dealing only with strictly polynomial non-commutative algebras, Melenk and Apel [MA94] developed a package for the computer algebra system REDUCE. That package provides tools to deal with certain non-commutative polynomial algebras and also contains a factorization algorithm for the supported algebras.
Beals and Kartashova [BK05] consider the problem of factoring polynomials in the second Weyl algebra, where they are able to deduce parametric factors. Research in a similar direction was done by Shemyakova in [She07, She09, She10] .
Another key exchange protocol based on non-commutative rings is presented in [CNT12] . The ring chosen in this publication is the ring of endomorphisms of Z p × Z p 2 , which is also not a principal ideal domain and therefore not subject to an attack as shown in [DK11] . It is to be pointed out that the authors used the same technique as in this paper for constructing commuting elements.
Concerning the task of finding commuting polynomials in the first Weyl algebra, a very thorough study is presented in [BC23] , which also demonstrates the hardness to find all commuting polynomials in skew-polynomial rings.
The Key Exchange Protocol

Description of the Protocol
We refer to our communicating parties as Alice (abbreviated A) and Bob (abbreviated B). Alice and Bob wish to construct and exchange a secret key using a Diffie-Hellmann-like cryptosystem.
The main idea is the same as in [BGG + 10]. It is summarized by the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 DH-like protocol with rings of type (1) 1: A and B publicly agree on a ring S of type (1), a non-central element L ∈ S, and two multiplicatively closed, commutative subsets of C l , Cr ⊂ S, whose elements do not commute with L. 2: A chooses a tuple (PA, QA) ∈ C l × Cr. 3: B chooses a tuple (PB, QB) ∈ C l × Cr. 4: A sends the product Apart := PA · L · QA to B. 5: B sends the product Bpart := PB · L · QB to A. 6: A computes PA · Bpart · QA. 7: B computes PB · Apart · QB.
Proof (Protocol). As P A , P B ∈ C l and Q A , Q B ∈ C r , we have the identity in step 8. Therefore, by the end of the key exchange, both A and B are in possession of the same secret key.
The remaining question concerning the feasibility of this approach is the construction of the sets C l , C r in Algorithm 1. We propose the following technique, which is applicable independent of the choice of S. Let P, Q ∈ S be chosen, such that they do not commute with L. Define
whereR is the subring of constants of S, andR[X] is the univariate commutative polynomial ring overR. For an element f ∈R[X], we let f (P ) denote the substitution of X in the terms of f by P , and similarly f (Q) denotes the substitution of X by Q. By this construction, all the elements in C l commute, as do the elements in C r . Using this technique, the first steps of Algorithm 1 can be altered in the following way. In step 1, A and B agree upon two elements P, Q ∈ S, which represent C l and C r , respectively, as in (3). Then each one of them chooses two random polynomials f, g inR[X], and obtains the tuple of secret keys in steps 2 and 3 by computing f (P ) and g(Q).
Example 6. Let S be the third Weyl algebra A 3 over the finite field F 71 , upon which A and B agree. Let
where L is the public polynomial as required in Algorithm 1, and P, Q, such that they define the sets C l and C r as in (3).
Suppose A chooses polynomials f A (X) = 48X 2 + 22X + 27, g A (X) = 58X 2 + 5X + 52, while B chooses f B (X) = 3X 2 + X + 31, g B (X) = 24X 2 + 4X + 11. Then the tuples are (P A = 48P 2 + 22P + 27, Q A = 58Q 2 + 5Q + 52), and (P B = 3P 2 + P + 31, Q B = 24Q 2 + 4Q + 11). Then, as described in the protocol, A send the product A part := P A · L · Q A to B, while B sends B part := P B · L · Q B to A, and their secret key is
(For brevity, the final expanded product is not shown here.)
Complexity of the Protocol
Of course, as our definition of the rings we consider in the protocol -namely rings of type (1) -is chosen to be as general as possible, a complexity discussion is highly dependent on the choice of the specific algebra. In practice, we envision that a certain finite subset of those algebras (such as, for example, the Weyl algebras, or iterated extensions of the rings used in [BGG + 10]) will be studied for practical applications. Our complexity discussion here focusses rather on the general setup than on concrete examples.
As we generally assume, all arithmetics in R, and therefore also in its subring of constantsR, can be computed in polynomial time. We suppose the same holds for the application of σ i and δ i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, to the elements of R, and that the time needed to choose a random element in R is polynomial in the desired bit length of this random element. Thus, the choice of a random element in S is just a finitely iterated application of the choice of coefficients, which lie in R. Let ω i (k) denote the cost of applying σ i (or δ i , depending on which one of them is non-trivial) to an element f ∈ R of bit-length k ∈ N. For two elements f, g ∈ R of bit-sizes k 1 , k 2 ∈ N, we denote the cost of multiplying them in R by θ(k 1 , k 2 ), and the cost of adding them by ρ(k 1 , k 2 ).
For the key exchange protocol the main cost that we need to address is the cost of multiplying two polynomials in S. For a monomial m := ∂ e1 1 · · · ∂ en n , where e ∈ N n 0 , one can generalize Lemma 1 to the multivariate case and find that multiplying m and f , where f has bit-size k, costs O(
bit-operations. For general polynomials in S, we obtain therefore the following property.
Lemma 2. Let n be the number of Ore extensions as in (1). For two polynomials h 1 , h 2 ∈ S, let d ∈ N 0 be the maximal degree among the ∂ i that appears in h 1 and h 2 , and let k 1 , k 2 ∈ N be the maximal bit-size among the coefficients of h 1 and h 2 , respectively. For notational convenience, we define ζ := n i=1 ω i (k 2 ). Then the cost of computing the product
Proof. We have at most d n terms in h 1 . When we multiply h 1 and h 2 , we have to regard each term separately, and compute the non-commutative relations. This results in the d 2n different computations of size ζ. Then, for every one of those results, we need to apply a multiplication in R with the coefficients of h 1 . In the end, the results of those multiplications have to be added together appropriately, which results in the above complexity.
This lemma shows that multiplying two elements in S has polynomial time complexity in the size of the elements, since the value of n is fixed for a chosen S.
Remark 2. The cost in Lemma 2 assumes the worst case, where each Ore extension of R has a nontrivial δ i . If for one of the extensions, δ i is equal to the zero map, then the worst case complexity in this variable is lower, as the term-wise multiplication does not result each time in a sum of different terms in ∂ i . One can see here, that in general, when the cost of the protocol is crucial for a resource-limited practical implementation, one should prefer Ore extensions where δ is the zero map.
Security Analysis
The Attacker's Problem
The security of our protocol relies on the difficulty of the following problem.
Given a ring S, two sets C l , C r of multiplicatively closed, commutative subsets of S, whose elements do not commute with a certain given L ∈ S. Furthermore, let the product P · L · Q for some (P, Q) ∈ C l × C r also be known.
Difficult Problem: Recover P or Q with the given information.
One way to solve this problem would be to factor P · L · Q, which appears, as mentioned in the introduction, to be hard.
Furthermore, due to the non-uniqueness of the factorization in Ore extensions, even if one is able to factor an intercepted product A part or B part , the factorization may not be the correct one.
Another attack for the potential eavesdropper is to guess the degrees of (P A , Q A ) (or (P B , Q B )) and to create an ansatz with the coefficients as unknowns, to form a system of multivariate polynomial equations to solve. This type of attack and its infeasibility was discussed already in [BGG + 10], Section 5.2., and the argumentation of the authors translates analogously to our setup.
We are not aware of any way to obtain the secret key of A and B while eavesdropping their communication channel in Algorithm 1 other than trying to recover the correct factorization from the exchanged products of the form P · L · Q.
Recommended Key Lengths
The question of recommended key lengths has to be discussed for each ring of type (1) separately. With lengths, one means in the context of this paper the degree of the chosen public polynomials L, P and Q in the ∂ i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and the size of their respective coefficients in R. We cannot state a recommendation for key-lengths that lead to secure keys for arbitrary choices of S. For the Weyl algebra, where some implementations of factoring algorithms are available, we could observe through experiments that generic choices of P and Q in C l and C r , respectively, each of total degree 20, lead to products P · L · Q which cannot be factored after a feasible amount of time. This choice of degree also assures that in the case where one uses a finite field as the ring of constants, a brute-force attack becomes impractical. If one chooses our approach (3) to find commuting elements, the choice of the degree of the polynomials inR[X] is the critical part, and the polynomials P and Q -as they are publicly known -can be chosen to be of small degree for performance's sake.
In general, for efficiency, we recommend choosing n = 2 for the ring S, as it already ensures that S is not a principal ideal domain and keeps multiplication costs low.
Remark 3. We tried to factor the exchanged products P A · L · Q A and P A · L · Q B from the small Example 6 in section 2.1 using Singular and REDUCE, and it turned out that both were not able to provide us with one factorization after 48 hours of computation on an iMac with 2.8Ghz (4 cores) and 8GB RAM available. This means that even for rather small choices of keys, the recovery of P and Q via factoring appears already to be hard using available tools. Of course, for this small key-choice, a brute-force ansatz attack would succeed fairly quick.
Implementation and Experiments
We developed an experimental implementation of the key exchange protocol as presented in Algorithm 1 in the programming language C 1 . We decided against experiments using commodity computer algebra systems, as the implemented algorithms are designed to be generally applicable to any ring and therefore come with a large amount of computational overhead. Our goal is to examine keylengths and the time it takes for calculating the secret keys. It is to be emphasized that our code leaves considerable room for improvement.
For the implementation, we chose our ring S to have the form as described in Example 3. In particular, our ring for the coefficients R is set to F 125 , and we fixed n := 2. Internally, we view F 125 isomorphically as F 5 (α) := F 5 [x]/ x 3 + 3x + 3 . Our non-commutative polynomial ring S is R[∂ 1 ; σ 1 ][∂ 2 ; σ 2 ], where
The ring of constants is thereforeR := F 5 ⊂ R. We obtained these two different automorphisms on F 5 (α) using the computer algebra system Sage [S + 14].
Note, that the multiplication of two elements f and g in this ring requires O(n 4 ) integer multiplications, where n = max{deg(f ), deg(g)}.
Following the notation as in Algorithm 1, our implementation generates random polynomials L, P and Q in S. Our element L is chosen to have total degree 50, and P , Q are both having total degree 5. Afterwards, it generates four polynomials inR[X] to obtain (P A , Q A ), (P B , Q B ) in the fashion of (3).
Subsequently, the program calculates the products P A · L · Q A , P B · L · Q B and the secret key
Naturally, some of those computations would be performed in parallel when the protocol is applied, but we did not bother about parallelism for our experimental setup. At runtime, all calculated values are printed out to the user.
We experimented with different degrees for the polynomials inR[X] to generate the private keys, namely 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50. This leads to respectively 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100 indeterminates for Eve to solve for if she eavesdrops the channel between Alice and Bob and tries to attack the protocol using an ansatz by viewing the coefficients as unknown parameters. Even if she decides to attack the protocol using brute force, she has to go through 5 10 , 5 20 , 5 30 , 5 40 and 5 50 possibilities respectively (note here, that for a brute force attack, Eve only needs to extract a right or left hand factor of the products P A · L · Q A and P B · L · Q B that Bob and Alice exchange). The file sizes and the timings for the experiments are illustrated in Figure 1 .
Note, that the file sizes are not indicative of the actual bit-size of the keys, as the files we produced are made to be human-readable. Allowing for this fact, the bit-sizes of our keys are comparable to those found necessary for secure implementations of the McEliece cryptosystem [McE78, BLP08] , which is a well-studied post-quantum encryption scheme.
In our experimental setup, we can see that one can generate a sufficiently secure key (20 for the elements inR[X]) within a couple of minutes at the current stage of the implementation. For larger degrees, we believe that machine-optimized code would decrease the computation time significantly. An interesting question is whether arithmetics in our class of non-commutative rings can be implemented in a smart way on a quantum computer. 
Insecure Keys
In this section, we will present an insecure key-choice for the Weyl algebras. The construction of those insecure keys, which is related to finding commutative subrings, can be applied to other algebras of type (1).
Insecure Keys for the Weyl Algebras
4.1.1 Graded Polynomials. Based on the paper [GHL14] , there is a large subset of the polynomial nth Weyl algebra, where the factorization problem of their elements can be reduced to factoring in a commutative, multivariate polynomial ring.
In particular, there exists a non-trivial Z n -grading on the polynomial nth Weyl algebra, where the zth graded part, for z ∈ Z n , can be characterized in the following way:
We call an element h in the polynomial nth Weyl algebra graded, if h ∈ A (z) n for some z ∈ Z n . These graded polynomials are exactly the ones for which the factorization problem can be reduced to commutative factorization as mentioned above. Now, there are two possible scenarios for weak key choices of A and B. Let L be the public Key, and P A , Q A and P B , Q B be the private keys of A and B respectively, i.e. the final key of A and B is
The first scenario is that all of the keys that A and B use are graded. Then a possible eavesdropper E can recover the private keys by factoring P A ·L ·Q A and P B ·L ·Q B , applying techniques presented by [GHL14] . The second scenario is that one of the private keys of P A , P B , Q A and Q B is graded. Without loss of generality, let P A be graded. Then E can recover P A by factoring every graded summand of P A · L · Q A , and therefore E can also recover Q A and the security is broken.
Fortunately, A and B can check their keys for being graded in polynomial time. In particular, for an element h the polynomial nth Weyl algebra, one has to check if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the difference of the exponents of x i and ∂ i is the same in every term of h. This is the case if and only if h is graded.
Remark 4. One can argue that the Weyl algebras as we define them assume that the x i are units, and therefore the attack as described here is not possible once we choose for our keys coefficients that have in the denominator some nontrivial polynomial in the x i . But there is a possibility to lift factorizations into the polynomial Weyl algebra, which is described in [GHL14] . Thus one has to lift the keys and double check for them being graded or not. This check obviously still requires only polynomial time.
Generally, as we can see here, one should study the concrete ring of type (1) chosen for Algorithm 1, in order to determine in which cases factorization can be reduced to an easy problem in commutative algebra, and avoid those cases for the key-choice. The construction of the insecure keys in the case of the Weyl algebra as presented here gives an idea how to find commutative subrings and how to avoid them.
Conclusion
The key exchange protocol as presented in [BGG + 10] has been altered and extended to be immune against the attack presented in [DK11] . The new version continues to have the positive properties discussed by Boucher et al. in their paper. The security of the presented protocol relies on the hardness of factoring in non-commutative rings and the non-uniqueness of the factorization. A class of insecure key choices that would reduce the problem to commutative factorization was outlined. Moreover, in our protocol, one can choose rings that are not Noetherian, where a general factorization algorithm might not even exist. An implementation is provided and we look forward to feedback from users.
We also mention here that related protocols can be developed from this idea. We present three in the appendices: a double-lock (or three-pass) protocol (Appendix A.1), an ElGamal-like encryption scheme (Appendix A.2.1), and an ElGamal-like digital signature scheme (Appendix A.2.2).
Interesting questions for future research are: For which choices of a ring S of type (1) can one construct an effective factorization algorithm using quantum computers? And furthermore, can one improve the computation of the arithmetics in those rings using a quantum computer?
We also hope for better implementations in the future for arithmetics in Ore polynomials, since the existing ones in recent computer algebra systems appear to be slow on large examples. This fact forced us to write our own experimental implementation to evaluate our protocol.
Algorithm 2 Double-lock exchange protocol with rings of type (1) 1: A and B publicly agree on a ring S of type (1), and two non-central elements P, Q ∈ S, such that P and Q do not commute with each other. 2: A chooses a secret L ∈ S, which does not commute with P or Q, that she chooses to share with B. 3: A chooses two random polynomials fA(X), gA(X) ∈R[X], and forms her private tuple (PA = fA(P ), QA = gA(Q)) ∈ S × S. If coincidentally either PA or QA commute with L, A must choose a different pair fA, gA. 4: A computes the product PA · L · QA, and sends it to B. 5: B chooses two random polynomials fB(X), gB(X) ∈R[X], and forms his private tuple (PB = fB(P ), QB = gB(Q)) ∈ S × S. If coincidentally either PB or QB commute with L, B must choose a different pair fB, gB. 6: B computes the intermediate product Pint = PB · PA · L · QA · QB(= PA · PB · L · QB · QA) and sends it to A. 7: A divides Pint on the right by QA, and on the left by PA. A sends the result, PB · L · QB, to B. 8: B divides PB · L · QB on the right by QB, and on the left by PB, to recover the secret L.
Remark A1. With L secretly agreed upon, Alice and Bob may now use Algorithm 1 to agree upon a secret key, with only P , Q being public. Note that they may choose a new set of tuples (P A , Q A ), (P B , Q B ), and indeed, may even publicly agree on a new choice of P and Q for Algorithm 1. In this way, the information exchanged during Algorithm 2 cannot help the eavesdropper to know the (P A , Q A ) and (P B , Q B ) used in Algorithm 1.
Remark A2. Naturally, Algorithm 2 can be used as a key exchange protocol by itself, where L is the key being exchanged. Deciding which protocol would be better in a given situation would require further investigation.
Remark A3. Regarding the requirement, at various points in Algorithm 2, that elements must not commute: If the elements did commute, we actually do not know of any attacks that would take advantage of this property. So these requirements may be unnecessary. However, in general terms, commuting algebraic objects are often easier to analyze than non-commuting ones, and might be easier to attack. Prudence therefore suggests that we choose non-commuting elements as much as possible, allowing commutativity only where it is needed by the protocol in order to function properly.
A.2 ElGamal-like Encryption and Signature Schemes
In 1984, ElGamal showed that a cryptosystem and digital signature scheme were possible using exponentiation in finite fields [ElG85] . Here, we will show that such schemes are also possible using non-commutative polynomial rings. There will necessarily be some differences between our protocols and those of ElGamal, since finite fields are commutative and all (non-zero) elements are invertible, whereas our structures are non-commutative and the elements are noninvertible. Nevertheless, protocols very similar to those of ElGamal can be developed.
